Reinforcement Learning with Analogical Similarity to Guide Schema
  Induction and Attention by Foster, James M. & Jones, Matt
OR I G I NA L A RT I C L E
Reinforcement Learningwith Analogical Similarity
to Guide Schema Induction and Attention
JamesM. Foster | Matt Jones
Department of Psychology andNeuroscience
Institute of Cognitive Science
University of Colorado, Boulder
1Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Institute of Cognitive
Science, University of Colorado, Boulder
Correspondence
JamesM. Foster
Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience
University of Colorado
345UCB
Boulder, CO, 80309
Email: james.m.foster@colorado.edu
Funding information
This work was supported by AFOSRGrant
FA-9550-10-1-0177 toMatt Jones.
Research in analogical reasoning suggests that higher-order
cognitive functions such as abstract reasoning, far transfer,
and creativity are founded on recognizing structural similar-
ities among relational systems. Here we integrate theories
of analogy with the computational framework of reinforce-
ment learning (RL).We propose a psychology theory that is
a computational synergy between analogy and RL, in which
analogical comparison provides the RL learning algorithm
with ameasure of relational similarity, and RL provides feed-
back signals that can drive analogical learning. Simulation
results support the power of this approach.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
How do people learn new abstract concepts? Everyone has a repertoire of concepts they use inmaking sense of the
world and filtering the infinite complexity of experience into manageable chunks. Abstract representations that capture
reoccurring patterns in the environment are used for generalization (i.e., making predictions or inferences about states
of the environment that haven’t been experienced before). How are these representations constructed, and how is their
usefulness evaluated? For example, how do people discover and apply concepts such as a ’fork’ in the game of chess?
How do scientists create theories such as natural selection?
The goal of the present work is to develop a computational understanding of how people learn abstract concepts.
Previous research in analogical reasoning suggests that higher-order cognitive functions such as abstract reasoning,
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2far transfer, and creativity are founded on recognizing structural similarities among relational systems (Doumas et al.,
2008; Gentner, 1983; Hummel and Holyoak, 2003). However, we argue a critical element is missing from these theories,
in that their operation is essentially unsupervised, merely seeking patterns that recur in the environment, rather than
focusing on the ones that are predictive of reward or other important outcomes.
Here we integrate theories of analogy with the computational framework of reinforcement learning (RL). RL offers
a family of learning algorithms that have been highly successful in machine learning applications (e.g., Bagnell and
Schneider, 2001; Tesauro, 1995) and that have neurophysiological support in the brain (e.g., Schultz et al., 1997). A
shortcoming of RL is that it only learns efficiently in complex tasks if it starts with a representation (i.e., a means for
encoding stimuli or states of the environment) that somehow captures the critical structure inherent in the task. We
formalize this notion below in terms of similarity-based generalization (Shepard, 1987) and kernel methods from
statistical machine learning (Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini, 2004). In other words, RL requires a sophisticated sense of
similarity to succeed in realistically complex tasks. Psychologically, the question of how such a similarity function is
learned can be cast as a question of learning sophisticated, abstract representations.
This paper proposes a computational model of analogical RL, in which analogical comparison provides the RL
learning algorithmwith ameasure of relational similarity, and RL provides feedback signals that can drive analogical
learning. Relational similarity enables RL to generalize knowledge from past to current situations more efficiently,
leading to faster learning. Conversely, the prediction-error signals from RL can be used to guide induction of new
higher-order relational concepts. Thus we propose there exists a computationally powerful synergy between analogy
and RL. The simulation experiment reported here supports this claim. Because of the strong empirical evidence for each
of thesemechanisms taken separately, we conjecture that the brain exploits this synergy as well.
We want to emphasize that this isn’t a theory of specific psychological phenomena. We’re coming from the
perspective that human conceptual learning and invention is far beyond current scientific explanation. There are no
existing models that can compare to what the brain achieves. Our goal is to explore where this powermight come from.
The computational frameworkwe propose is grounded in well-established psychological principles that themselves
are supported by large bodies of experimental evidence, but the aim of our model is not to explain specific data. It’s to
demonstrate the potential power that comes from combining these principles in the waywe propose. Thus the scope
of this paper is to understand how the proposedmechanismmight work in principle. Future workwill derive testable
predictions and empirical means for testing them.
In the following sections, wewill review analogy and RL, then lay out our computational proposal and present a
formal model, then present simulation results and discuss implications and limitations of themodel.
2 | ANALOGY
Research in human conceptual knowledge representation has shown that concepts are represented not just as distribu-
tions of features (cf. Nosofsky, 1986; Rosch andMervis, 1975) but as relational structures. This relational knowledge
includes both internal structure, such as the fact that a robin’s wings allow it to fly (Sloman et al., 1998), as well as
external structure, such as the fact that a dog likes to chase cats (Jones and Love, 2007). Theories of analogical reasoning
represent relational knowledge of this type in a predicate calculus that binds objects to the roles of relations, for
example CHASE(DOG,CAT). According to these theories, an analogy between two complex episodes (each a network of
relations and objects) amounts to recognition that they share a common relational structure (Gentner, 1983; Hummel
andHolyoak, 2003).
At amoremechanistic level, the dominant theory of analogy is structural alignment (Gentner, 1983). This process
3involves building a mapping between two episodes, mapping objects to objects and relations to relations. The best
mapping is one that maps objects to similar objects, maps relations to similar relations, andmost importantly, satisfies
parallel connectivity. Parallel connectivity means that, whenever two relations aremapped to each other, the objects
filling their respective role-fillers are alsomapped together. An example is shown in Figure 1. Parallel connectivity is
satisfied here because, for each mapped pair of ATTACK relations (red arrows), the objects filling the ATTACKER role
aremapped together (knight is mapped to queen), and the objects filling the ATTACKED role are alsomapped together
(rook to rook and king to king). Thus structural alignment constitutes a (potentially partial or imperfect) isomorphism
between two episodes, which respects the relational structure that they have in common. Importantly, if the search for a
mapping gives little emphasis to object-level similarity (as opposed to relation-level similarity and parallel connectivity),
then structural alignment can find abstract commonalities between episodes having little or no surface similarity (i.e., in
terms of perceptual features).
F IGURE 1 An example of structural alignment between two chess positions. Both positions contain instances of the
abstract concept of a FORK: black’s piece is simultaneously attacking both of white’s pieces. These attacking relations
are represented by the red arrows. Cyan lines indicate themapping between the two episodes. Themapping satisfies
parallel connectivity because it respects the bindings between relations and their role-fillers.
We propose structural alignment is critical to learning of abstract concepts for three reasons. First, perceived
similarity of relational stimuli depends on structural alignability (Markman and Gentner, 1993). Second, structural
alignment is important for analogical transfer, which is the ability to apply knowledge from one situation to another,
superficially different situation (Gick andHolyoak, 1980). For example, awinningmove in one chess position can be used
to discover awinningmove in a different (but aligned) position, by translating that action through the analogicalmapping.
Third, a successful analogy can lead to schema induction, which involves extraction of the shared relational structure
identified by the analogy (Doumas et al., 2008; Gentner, 1983; Hummel and Holyoak, 2003). In the example of Figure 1,
this schemawould be a system of relational knowledge on abstract (token) objects, including ATTACK(PIECE1,PIECE2),
ATTACK(PIECE1,PIECE3), and potentially other shared information such as NOT_ATTACKED(PIECE1) and KING(PIECE2).
These three observations suggest that analogy plays an important role in learning and use of abstract relational
concepts. The first two observations suggest that analogical transfer is like similarity-based generalization, but it’s also
more sophisticated because it takes structure into account, as we elaborate in the next two sections. In brief, structural
alignment offers a sophisticated form of similarity that can be used to generalize knowledge between situations that are
superficially very different. The third observation suggests that analogy can discover new relational concepts (e.g., the
concept of a chess fork, from Figure 1), which can in turn lead to perception of evenmore abstract similarities among
future experiences.
One potential shortcoming of the basic theory of analogy reviewed here is that is it essentially unsupervised. In this
4framework, the quality of an analogy depends only on howwell the two systems can be structurally aligned, and not on
how useful or predictive the shared structuremight be. For example, one could list many relational patterns that arise in
chess games but that are not especially useful for choosing amove or for predicting the course of the game. In previous
work, we have found that implementing structural alignment and schema induction in a rich and structured artificial
environment results in discovery of many frequent but mostly useless schemas (Foster et al., 2012). An alternative,
potentially more powerful model of analogical learning would involve feedback from the environment, so that the
value of an analogy or schema is judged partially by how well it improves predictions of reward or other important
environmental variables. For example, the concept of a fork in chess is an important schema not (only) because it is
a recurring pattern in chess environments, but because it carries information about significant outcomes (i.e., about
sudden changes in each player’s chances of winning). A natural framework for introducing this sort of reward sensitivity
into theories of analogy is that of RL, which we review next.
3 | REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
RL is a mathematical and computational theory of learning from reward in dynamic environments. An RL task is
characterized by an agent embedded in an environment that exists in some state at any givenmoment in time. At each
time step, the agent senses the state of its environment, takes an action that affects what state occurs next, and receives
a continuous-valued reward that depends on the state and its action (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This framework is very
general and can encompass nearly any psychological task in which the subject has full knowledge of the state of the
world at all times (i.e., there are no relevant hidden variables).
Most RLmodels work by learning values for different states or actions, which represent the total future reward that
can be expected from any given starting point (i.e., from any state or from any action within a state). These values can be
learned incrementally, from temporal-difference (TD) error signals calculated from the reward and state following each
action (seeModel section). There is strong evidence that the brain computes something close to TD error, and thus that
RL captures a core principle of biological learning (Schultz et al., 1997).
In principle, this type of simple algorithm could be used to perfectly learn a complex task such as chess, by expe-
riencing enough games to learn the true state values (i.e., probability of winning from every board position) and then
playing according to those values. However, a serious shortcoming of this naive approach is that it learns the value
of each state independently, which can be hopelessly inefficient for realistic tasks that typically have very large state
spaces. Instead, some form of generalization is needed, to allow value estimates for one state to draw on experience in
other, similar states.
Many variants of RL have been proposed for implementing generalization among states (e.g., Albus, 1981; Sutton,
1988). Here we pursue a direct and psychologically motivated form of generalization, based on similarity (Jones
and Cañas, 2010; Ormoneit and Sen, 2002). We assume the model has a stored collection of exemplar states, each
associatedwith a learned value. This exemplar representation is particularly suited for the analogymodel we present
below because it allows us to treat schemas as exemplars. The value estimate for any state is obtained by a similarity
weighted average over the exemplars’ values; that is, knowledge from each exemplar is used in proportion to how
similar it is to the current state. This approach is closely related to exemplar-generalizationmodels in more traditional
psychological tasks such as category learning (Nosofsky, 1986). It can also be viewed as a subset of kernel methods from
machine learning (Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini, 2004), under the identification of the kernel functionwith psychological
similarity (Jäkel et al., 2008).
A critical consideration for all learning models (including RL models) is howwell their pattern of generalization
5matches the inherent structure of the task. If generalization is strong only between stimuli or states that have similar
values or outcomes, then learning will be efficient. On the other hand, if themodel generalizes significantly between
stimuli or states with very different outcomes, its estimates or predictions will be biased and learning and performance
will be poor. The kernel or exemplar-similarity approach makes this connection explicit, because generalization be-
tween two states is directly determined by their similarity. As we propose next, analogy and schema induction offer a
sophisticated form of similarity that is potentially quite powerful for learning complex tasks with structured stimuli.
4 | ANALOGICAL RL
The previous two sections suggest a complementary relationship between analogy and RL, which hint at the potential
for a computationally powerful, synergistic interaction between these two cognitive processes. We outline here a
formal theory of this interaction. The next two sections provide amathematical specification of a partial implementation
of this theory, and then present simulation results offering a proof-in-principle of the computational power of this
approach.
The first proposed connection between analogy and RL is that structural alignment yields an abstract form of
psychological similarity that can support sophisticated generalization (Gick and Holyoak, 1980;Markman and Gentner,
1993). Incorporating analogical similarity into the RL framework could thus lead to rapid learning in complex, structured
environments. For example, an RLmodel of chess equippedwith analogical similarity and a notion of an attack relation
should recognize the similarity between the twopositions in Figure 1 andhence generalize between them. Consequently
the model should learn to create forks and to avoid forks by the opponent much more rapidly than if it had to learn
about each possible fork instance individually.
The second proposed connection is that the TD error computed by RL models, for updating value estimates,
can potentially drive analogical learning by guiding schema induction and attention. Instead of forming schemas for
whatever relational structures are frequently encountered (or are discovered by analogical comparison of any two
states), an analogical RLmodel can bemore selective, only inducing schemas from analogies that significantly improve
reward prediction. Such analogies indicate that the structure common to the two analogue states may have particular
predictive value in the current task, and hence that it might be worth extracting as a standalone concept. For example, if
the model found a winning fork move by analogical comparison to a previously seen state involving a fork, the large
boost in reward could trigger induction of a schema embodying the abstract concept of a fork. Furthermore, themodel
can use prediction error to increase attention to concepts that are more useful for predicting reward, and decrease
attention to concepts that are less useful. Such an attention-learningmechanism is proposed to bias themodel to rely
more on concepts that have been consistently useful in the past.
The proposedmodel thus works as follows (see the next section for technical details). Themodel maintains a set of
exemplars E , eachwith a learned value, v (E ). To estimate the value of any state S , it compares that state to all exemplars
by structural alignment, which yields ameasure of analogical similarity for each exemplar (Forbus and Gentner, 1989).
The estimated value of the state, V˜ (s), is then obtained as a similarity-weighted average of v (E ). After any action is
taken and the immediate reward and next state are observed, a TD error is computed as in standard RL. The exemplar
values are then updated in proportion to the TD error and in proportion to howmuch each contributed to themodel’s
prediction, that is, in proportion to sim(s, E ).
The attentions u(E ) implement exemplar-specific attentions weights or learning rates. Attention learning is an
additional mechanism of themodel whose purpose is to increase themodel’s reliance on useful exemplars. Although
themodel makes sense without this attention learningmechanism, including it improves performance and integrates
6analogy, RL, and attention, and has been demonstrated in experiments with humans (Foster and Jones, 2013b; Foster,
2015). Amodel that increases its repertoire of concepts needs some pruningmechanism to sort throughwhat’s been
discovered. This attention learning approach is a reasonable way to handle the pruning problem in an exemplar setting:
themodel needs to learn which exemplars or schemas to retain, so we attach an attention value to each one.
The u(E ) values can also be thought of as voting weights in the computation of V˜ (s). Exemplars with higher u values
have greater influence on the similarity-weighted average of exemplar values. The attentions are updated in proportion
to the TD error, in proportion to howmuch each contributed to themodel’s prediction, and in proportion to howmuch
that exemplar’s prediction differed from the overall prediction V˜ . Attention is increased to exemplars that individually
made amore accurate prediction that the overall prediction, and attention is decreased to exemplars that individually
made a less accurate prediction than the overall prediction.
Analogy andRL alsomutually facilitate eachother through an additionalmechanismof schema induction. Whenever
the structural alignment between a state and an exemplar produces a sufficient reduction in prediction error (relative to
what would be expected if that exemplar were absent), a schema is induced from that analogy. The schema is an abstract
representation, defined on token (placeholder) objects, and it contains only the shared information thatwas successfully
mapped by the analogy. The schema is added to the pool of exemplars, where it can acquire value associations directly
(just like the exemplars do). Theoretically, we take the position that there is no real psychological difference between
schemas and concrete state exemplars, it’s just a continuumof specificity. The advantage conferred by the new schema is
that it allows for even faster learning about all states it applies to (i.e., that contain that substructure). For example, rather
than learning by generalization among different instances of forks, themodel would learn a direct value for the fork
concept, which it could immediately apply to any future instances. A consequence of the schema inductionmechanism
is that the pool of exemplars comes to contain more and more abstract schemas. Thus the model’s representation
transitions from initially episodic to more abstract and conceptual. The facilitation between analogy and RL here is that
analogy provides new representations for RL to use for its value learning, and RL provides a TD error signal to help
analogy decide which schemas to build.
Analogical RL thus integrates three principles from prior research: RL, exemplar generalization, and structural
alignment of relational representations. Because each of these principles has strong empirical support as a psychological
mechanism, it is plausible that they all interact in amanner similar to what we propose here. Thus it seems fruitful to
explore computationally what thesemechanisms can achieve when combined.
5 | MODEL
The proposedmodel applies toMarkov Decision Process tasks, where an agent makes decisions based on the current
state of the environment. At each time step, the agent chooses from the available actions in the current state and then
the environment gives the agent an immediate reward andmoves into the next state.
The simulation study presented below uses a variant of RL known as afterstate learning, in which the agent learns
values for the possible states it can move into (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is a reasonable and efficient method
for the task we use here—tic-tac-toe, or noughts & crosses—because the agent’s opponent can be treated as part of
the environment and is the only source of randomness. Ourmain proposal regarding the interaction between RL and
analogical learning is not limited to this approach.
The operation of themodel is illustrated in Figure 2. On each time step, themodel identifies all possible actions and
their associated afterstates. For each afterstate S , it computes an analogical similarity, sim(S , E ), to each exemplar, E ,
by structural alignment. At the theoretical level, themodel does not commit to a particular mapping algorithm. Instead,
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F IGURE 2 Schema InductionModel operation. Each candidate afterstate is evaluated by analogical comparison to
stored exemplars, followed by similarity-weighted averaging among the learned exemplar values. Learning is by TD
error applied to the exemplar values. On some trials, especially useful analogies produce new schemas that are added to
the exemplar pool. In the example here, S and E both have guaranteed wins for X by threatening a win in twoways. The
induced schema embodies this abstract structure. Dots with red arrows indicate ternary “same-rank” relations.
we assume the mapping could be done by any of the extant mapping models (e.g., Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Larkey
and Love, 2003; Hummel andHolyoak, 2003; Hofstadter et al., 1994). Each possible mappingM : S → E is evaluated
according to
Φ(M ) = β ·
∑
o∈s
sim (o,M (o)) +∑
r ∈s
sim (r ,M (r )) ·
[
1 +
nr∑
i=1
I{M (childi (r ))=childi (M (r ))}
]
. (1)
This expression takes into account object similarity, by comparing each object o in S to its image inE ; relational similarity,
by comparing each relation r in S to its image in E ; and parallel connectivity, by having similarity between mutually
mapped relations “trickle down” to add to the similarity of anymutually mapped role-fillers (Forbus and Gentner, 1989).
The sim function is a primitive (object- and relation-level) similarity function, β determines the relative contribution
of object similarity, nr is the number of roles in relation r , childi (r ) is the object filling the i th role of r , and I{P } is an
indicator function equal to 1when proposition P is true.
Amore intuitive understanding of theΦ(M ) equationmay come from a description of its implementation, which
works as follows. Given amapping, a schema is created for that mapping (one node for each pair of mapped nodes, with
links between schema nodeswhen there’s parallel links in S andE . The schema nodes are sorted by concept type, so that
higher-order concepts are processed first. Then, each node is processed by incrementing its score by a constant, and
incrementing its child nodes’ scores by a trickle down factor times its score. Finally, each node’s final score is summed
to get a total score for themapping. This trickle down scoring gives a bonus to systematic mappings (those that share
8systems of relations governed by common higher-order relations).
Analogical similarity is then defined as the value of the best mapping (here the θ parameter determines specificity
of generalization):
sim(S , E ) = exp
(
θ ·max
M
Φ(M )
)
. (2)
The activation a(E ) of each exemplar is determined by weighting the analogical similarity between that exemplar E
and the candidate state S by its attention u and normalizing by the attention-weighted analogical similarity across all
exemplars:
a(E ) = u(E ) · sim(S , E )∑
E ′∈Exempl ar s
u(E ′) · sim(S , E ′) . (3)
The estimated value of S , V˜ (S ), is computed as a similarity-weighted average of the exemplar values v (E ):
V˜ (S ) =
∑
v (E ) · a(E ). (4)
Thus the estimate is based on the learned values of the exemplars most similar to the candidate state and the exemplars
with the highest attention weights.
There is a separate pass through thewhole network for each candidate state (i.e., an outer loop over candidates).
Although our model evaluates all possible afterstates, a more realistic model would be selective. How an agent decides
which options to even consider is an important question but is outside the scope of this paper.
Once values V˜ (S ) have been estimated for all candidate afterstates, the model uses a softmax (Luce-choice or
Gibbs-sampling rule) to select what state tomove into (here τ is an exploration parameter):
Pr[St = S ] ∝ eV˜ (S )/τ . (5)
Learning based on the chosen afterstate St follows the SARSA rule (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994), after themodel
chooses its action on the next time step. This produces a TD error, which is then used to update the exemplar values and
exemplar attention or voting weights by gradient descent. Exemplar values are updated in proportion to the TD error
and their activations:
4v (E ) =  ·T D · a(E ) (6)
where  is a learning rate. Exemplar attentions are updated in proportion to the learning rate , the TD error, the
analogical similarity between the exemplar and candidate state sim(S , E ), and the difference between the exemplar
value v (E ) and the estimated value of the candidate state V˜ (S ), normalized by the attention-weighted analogical
similarity across all exemplars:
∆u(E ) =  ·T D · sim(S , E ) · (v (E ) − V˜ (S ))∑
E ′∈Exempl ar s
u(E ′) · sim(S , E ′) . (7)
This exemplar-specific attention weight learningmechanism (u parameter in the equations) allows themodel to
9learn which exemplars aremost useful for reducing prediction error. Over time, themodel learns to increase attention
to exemplars which are predictive of reward outcome, and decrease attention to exemplars which are not predictive of
outcome.
Following learning after each trial, the schema induction mechanism determines howmuch each exemplar con-
tributed to reducing prediction error, by comparing TD to what it would have been without that exemplar. If the
reduction is above some threshold, the analogical mapping found for that exemplar (lower right of Figure 2) produces a
schema that is added to the exemplar pool (far right). The schema is given a value of v initialized at V˜ (St ). This schema
value is updated on future trials just as are the exemplar values. Acquisition of new schemas in this way is predicted to
improve themodel’s pattern of generalization, tuning it to themost useful relational structures in a task.1
6 | SIMULATION
The goal of the simulation was to test whether themodel could (1) learnmore quickly by generalizing between states
sharing structure but not surface similarity and (2) bootstrap its learning by discovering composite structures (schemas)
that are particularly predictive. If themodel succeeded at these twomeasures, then that would suggest it has potential
to exhibit humanlike behavior in more complex settings. For example, themodel might offer insight into how humans
become experts in complex games like chess and Go, or how they acquire and apply relationally complex sentence
structures (see Goldwater et al., 2011).
The analogical RLmodel was tested on its ability to learn tic-tac-toe (Foster and Jones, 2013a). Tic-tac-toe was
chosen as a test domain because it is a simple gamewith relational structure and a clear task goal. However, wewant
to be clear that this is not a theory of how people play tic-tac-toe. People are typically given explicit instruction on
the rules, goals, andwinning states of the game. Themodel isn’t provided any rules of the game, other than implicitly
knowing what moves are legal at any point (i.e., you can only move in an empty square) and the model doesn’t know
what constitutes a win. Instead, themodel learns entirely from trial and error. Whereas people are able to look ahead
andmentally simulatemoves several steps into the future, themodel as currently implemented does not look ahead
beyond the current move.
In the simulation, each board position was represented by treating the nine squares as objects of types 0 (blank), 1
(focal agent’s), and 2 (opponent’s), and defining 8 ternary “same-rank” relations for the rows, columns, and diagonals.
Thus a player wins by filling all squares in any one of these relations (see Figure 3). Object similarity was defined as 1 for
matching object types and 0 otherwise. Similarity between relations was always 1 because there was only one type
TABLE 1 Model Variations.
Model Variation AdditionalMechanism Tested
Featural
Relational Relational similarity
Unguided Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions Schema induction
Guided Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions Schema induction guided by RL
Guided Schema Induction, Learned Attentions State and Schema attentions guided by RL
1Schemas can be spawned from the mapping between a candidate state and an exemplar state (schema induction) as well as from the mapping between a
candidate state and an exemplar schema (schema refinement;Doumas et al., 2008)
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of relation. Reward was given only at the end of a game, as +1 for the winner, -1 for the loser, or 0 for a draw. After
the game ended, it moved to a special terminal state with fixed value of 0. For simplicity, all free parameters of the
model (β , θ, α , γ, τ) were set to a default value of 1, except the schema induction threshold which was set to 6 standard
deviations above themean TD error reduction on each turn.
F IGURE 3 Relations Defined on the Tic-Tac-Toe board. The figure illustrates the 8 ternary relations that the
RelationalModel uses to represent a state of the game. There are three relations for the 3 vertical columns (in red), 3
relations for the 3 horizontal rows (in orange), and 2 relations for the diagonals (in yellow). Each relation has 3 roles,
which are filled by the objects in their corresponding board locations.
State exemplars (i.e., non-schema exemplars) were added to themodel probabilistically, with probability of recruit-
ment inversely proportional to the number of state exemplars already recruited. Recruitment of duplicate exemplars
was not allowed.
Five variations of the model were implemented to verify its mechanisms. Each model variation builds on the
previous variation by adding an additional mechanism (see Table 1).
The Featural model was restricted to literal mappings between states (upper-left square to upper-left square,
etc.). This model still included generalization, but its similarity was restricted to the concrete similarity of standard
feature-basedmodels. Featural similarity was defined as the proportion of matching objects in the same absolute board
locations.
The Relational model considered all 8 mappings defined by rigid rotation and reflection of the board. This scheme
was used in place of searching all 9! possible mappings for every comparison, to reduce computation time (see Figure 4).
The Unguided Schema Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions model extended the Relational model by inducing
schemas that capture the relational structure critical to the task. This model variation included schema induction and
relational similarity, but the schema induction process was not guided by RL feedback. Instead, this baseline model
randomly induced schemas between exemplars and the current state (or between schemas and the current state). The
number of schemas induced was determined by yoking to the feedback-guided schema induction model. Thus this
yoked baselinemodel induced the same number of schemas as the feedback-guided schema inductionmodel, but the
11
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(d)
F IGURE 4 Featural vs. Relational Similarity in the Tic-Tac-Toe implementation. X indicates themodel’s token, O
indicates the opponent’s token, blank indicates an open space on the grid. Similarity is inversely related to the number
of differences between states and states, or between states and schemas. Asterisks indicate board locations that are
not part of the schema, and so do not contribute to the count of differences. (a) The featural and relational model
similarity would be the same because all tokens match based on their absolute board locations. (b) The relational model
would score these two states as having higher similarity because it allows for the reflection of the board, whereas the
featural model would count four differences. (c) The schema on the right contains three X’s in a row, as well as twoO’s,
two blanks, and two locations that are not part of the schema. (d) The schema on the right has been further refined, and
is "clean" in that it only represents the information relevant to a winning board configuration, 3 X’s in a row
particular schemas learned were induced from comparisons between the current state and randomly chosen exemplars.
The hypothesis was that the feedback-guided schema inductionmodel would learn faster than the unguidedmodel, and
would also discover more useful representations.
The Guided Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions model extended the Unguided Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions
model by using RL to guide schema induction. Whenever an exemplar was particularly useful (meaning it reduced TD
error by a thresholded amount), that exemplar was used to induce a schema by comparing it to the candidate state. The
threshold usedwas in terms of standard deviations in reduction of TD error. The reduction in TD error was computed
by leaving out each exemplar and computing TDwithout it. The difference between the TD error with andwithout an
exemplar is the reduction in TD for that exemplar. Exemplars whose reductions were greater than 6 standard deviations
above themean reduction were used to induce schemas. Thus in this model, RL is used both to learn the values of the
exemplars and to guide schema induction.
The Guided Schema Induction, Learned Attentions model extended the Guided Schema Induction, Fixed Attentions
model by using RL to learn exemplar-specific attention weights (the u values). Each exemplar’s attention weight u was
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initialized to 1. Over time themodel uses the TD error signal to update the attention weights so that particularly useful
exemplars have their attentions increased andmisleading exemplars have their attentions decreased (see Equation 7).
Anytime an exemplar’s attention went below 0, it was pruned from the exemplar pool.
Eachmodel variant was trained in blocks of 10 games of self-play. In self play, at the start of each game themodel
variant was cloned and played a game against itself. Learning (updates to v and u) was cached during the game and then
applied after the game finished. Learning occurred only during training. Following each block of 10 self-play games,
themodel was tested in a pair of games against an ideal player (playing first in one game and second in the other). The
ideal player was given the correct values for every state and always moved into the highest-valued next state. In testing
games, themodel was given one point for each non-losingmove it made (i.e., moves fromwhich it could still guarantee a
draw), for a maximum of 9 points per pair of testing games. In other words, points were awarded for how long themodel
could play before the ideal opponent could guarantee awin. More rigorously, the ideal player is defined by backward
induction, partitioning the state space into states fromwhich ideal play on both sides will lead to a draw, an Xwin, or an
Owin. Tic-tac-toe has the property that the initial (blank) state lies in the first of these three subsets. Themodel’s score
is determined by how long it keeps the game in that regime.
F IGURE 5 Simulation Results. Performance of the fourmodel variations over 50,000 training games. The featural
model (black) is extremely slow to learn. The relational model (red) uses analogical generalization and performs better
than the featural model. Adding schema induction (light blue) to the relational model does not improve performance,
unless the schema induction process is guided by reinforcement learning (dark blue). Adding the exemplar-specific
attention learningmechanism (green) to the guided schema inductionmodel further improves performance.
Performance is measured by points, which is the number of movesmade before the game is a sure loss against an ideal
player, and is averaged across 64 independent copies of themodel. Shading around each line indicates standard error
bars. Training games are labeled in units of 5000 games.
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7 | RESULTS
Averaged learning curves are shown in Figure 5 for 64 independent copies of each model over 5000 blocks (50,000
training games). These results show that the featural model (black) is extremely slow to learn. The relational model (red)
uses analogical generalization and performs better than the featural model. Adding schema induction (light blue) to the
relational model does not improve performance, unless the schema induction process is itself guided by the prediction
error signal (dark blue). There is a further improvement in performance when the model can also learn to adapt its
attentions based on prediction error with the exemplar-specific attention learningmechanism (green).
As themodel learns from training games, it updates its estimate of the value and attention for each exemplar. Figure
6 shows timelines of themodel’s values (v) and attentions (u) as themodel learns frommore training games. Values and
attentions are plotted separately for states recruited as exemplars vs. schemas induced by themodel. The values for
schemas tend to bemore extreme (either highly positive or highly negative) than the values for states, and so aremore
diagnostic ofwinning or losing board positions. Additionally, the attentions for schemas tend to be larger than attentions
for states. An exemplar with a higher attention value tends tomake especially accurate reward predictions. The overall
larger attentions for schemas (as compared to states) indicates that schemas are, overall, more useful exemplars for
reward prediction. The important conclusion is that the model learns to shift its representation of the environment
from states that it has directly experienced tomore abstract schematic representations.
Examples of some of themost useful representations learned by the Schema Inductionmodel are shown in Figure 7.
The schemas in (a) represent winning states of tic-tac-toe. The top left schema perfectly matches (with a similarity of 1)
any tic-tac-toe state with 3 X’s in the bottom row, the left row, the right row, or the top row - regardless of which objects
(X, O, or blank) occupy the other grid locations. Similarly, the left schema in (b) perfectly matches any tic-tac-toe state
with anO in the center, an O in a corner, and a blank in the opposite corner. This schema represents the state in which
the model is about to lose the game by an opponent making 3 O’s along the diagonal. These two schemas are “pure”
or “clean” in that they contain no information that’s irrelevant to the winning or about-to-win states. However, the
right schema in (a) does contain an irrelevant piece of information - the O in the top center grid location. This schema is
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F IGURE 6 Value and Attention Learning for States vs. Schemas over 50,000 training games. Averages for states
(red dotted lines) vs. schemas (solid blue lines) for 64 independent copies of the Guided Schema Induction, Learned
Attentions model. (a) Average absolute value of V for states vs. schemas as themodel learns. Schemas quickly increase
in absolute value compared to states, indicating that they aremore diagnostic of winning and losing. (b) Once schemas
begin to be induced, they rapidly rise in attentionU and competitively reduce attention to states, which indicates that
themodel is learning that schemas aremore useful representations than states. Training games are labeled in units of
5000 games.
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F IGURE 7 Examples of some of the representations with the highest attentions, as averaged over 64 independent
copies of the Guided Schema Induction, Learned Attentionsmodel after 50,000 training games. Because themodel is
implementedwith afterstates, in each of these examples is valued from the perspective of themodel (X) just having
placed a token, and it being the opponent’s (O) turn. Themodel associates (a) and (c) with positive reward value, and (b)
and (d) with negative reward value, but all have high attentions because they are useful for predicting reward. (a)
Examples of schemas wheremodel wins the game. (b) Examples of schemas where themodel is about to lose. (c)
Examples of states where themodel has twoways to win, and the opponent can only block one of them. (d) Examples of
states where the opponent may have twoways to win. In the left board, a play byO in the top right corner will create
twoways for the opponent to win. In the right board, the opponent is about to win, perhaps because it had produced a
fork before X played in the left-center position.
“dirty” in that it contains irrelevant details from the states fromwhich it was induced. With further training, themodel
would likely refine this schema and learn that abstracting out theO provides amore general, more useful schema. The
right schema in (b) is also "dirty" in that it contains the extraneous X in the top left corner. The states in (c) represent
something like "forks" in the tic-tac-toe domain, where themodel has twoways to win and the opponent can only block
one of them. The left state in (d) represents a state the model should avoid, because it provides opportunity for the
opponent to create a fork by playing in the top right corner. In the right board in (d), the opponent is about to win,
possibly because it had created a fork before X played in the left-center position.
8 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results presented here constitute a proof-of-principle that analogy and schema induction can be productively
integratedwith a learning framework founded on RL and similarity-based generalization. This integration leads to a
model exhibiting sophisticated, abstract generalization derived from analogical similarity, as well as discovery of new
relational structures driven by their ability to predict reward.
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The basic modeling framework used here applies not just to analogical similarity and schema induction, but to other
forms of representational learning as well. Kernel-based RL offers a powerful and general theory of representation
learning, because it can be integrated with any form of representation that yields a pairwise similarity function. Its
TD error signal can drive changes in representation via the objective of improving generalization. This idea has been
applied to learning of selective attention among continuous stimulus dimensions (Jones and Cañas, 2010). The current
model offers a richer form of representation learning, in that it acquires new concepts rather than reweighting existing
features.
8.1 | RelatedModels
The analogical RL model also builds on other models of relational learning. Tomlinson and Love (2006) propose a
model of analogical category learning (BRIDGES), with essentially the same similarity and exemplar generalization
mechanisms adopted in the presentmodel. Ourmodel adds to theirs in that it applies to dynamic tasks and in that it
grows its representation through schema induction. In BRIDGES, analogy contributes to RL by providing relational
generalization. Ourmodel also has the reverse, in that RL guides schema induction and hence acquisition of abstract
concepts. VanOtterlo (2012) has developedmethods for applying RL to relational representations of the same sort
used here, although the approach to learning is quite different. His models are not psychologically motivated and hence
learn in batches and formmassive conjunctive rules, with elaborate updating schemes to keep track of the possible
combinations of predicates. In contrast, the present approach learns iteratively, behaves probabilistically, and grows its
representationmore gradually and conservatively. This approach is likely to provide a better account of human learning,
but amore interesting questionmay bewhether it offers any performance advantages from a puremachine-learning
perspective.
In the present model, the activation of each exemplar elicited by a candidate state can be thought of as a feature of
that state. The exemplar effectively has a “receptive field” within the state space, defined by the similarity function. This
duality between exemplar- and feature-based representations is founded in the kernel framework (see Shawe-Taylor and
Cristianini, 2004). The present model takes advantage of this duality, producing a smooth transition from an episodic,
similarity-based representation to amore semantic, feature-based representation defined by learned schemas.
The value and attention learningmechanisms have roots in traditional associational learningmodels. The classic
Rescorla-Wagnermodel introduced joint learning of cue-outcome associations, but had nomechanism for attention
learning (Rescorla et al., 1972). Although the Rescorla-Wagner model allowed for different input cues to have different
associabilities, there was no mechanism for learning these attentions. Mackintosh (1975) introduced an attention
learningmechanismwhichmodifies attention to cues to reduce prediction error and reduce interference between cues.
Support for this attention learningmechanism comes from demonstrations of learned inattention in experiments with
rats (Mackintosh and Turner, 1971) and humans (Kruschke and Blair, 2000).
Although the analogical RL attention-learningmechanism in the present work is being implemented in an exemplar
model, it is compatible withMackintosh’s theory andwith extensions by Kruschke (2001). Each of thesemodels would
predict that attention would increase to lower-variance cues based on the idea that attention increases to cues that are
more predictive (contribute less error), compared to the average individual cue predictiveness (as inMackintosh (1975)
and Kruschke (2001)’s mixture of experts model) or the overall combined cue predictiveness (as in Kruschke (2001)’s
EXITmodel and the present ARLmodel). In the exemplar setting, themodel needs to learn which exemplars to retain in
order to interpolate the reward value of each new stimulus based on learned exemplars. Thus the present ARLmodel
also includes a normalization in the definition of exemplar activation, whichmakes attentionmore like a voting weight
and less like salience.
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The present work is complementary to hierarchical Bayesianmodels that discover relational structure through
probabilistic inference (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Whereas ourmodel builds up schemas from simpler representations,
theBayesian approach takes a top-downapproach, defining the complete space of possibilities a priori and then selecting
among them. The top-down approach applies to any learningmodel, because anywell-defined algorithm can always
be circumscribed in terms of its set of reachable knowledge states. This is a useful exercise for identifying inductive
biases and absolute limits of learning, but it offers little insight into the constructive processes that actually produce the
learning. The presentmodel offers proposals about themechanisms underlying how the humanmind discovers new,
abstract concepts. Extensions to this model are discussed in the following sections.
8.2 | Afterstate vs. Forestate Learning
Although the tic-tac-toe domain is well captured with an afterstate representation, most tasks can’t use this simplifica-
tion. In the forestate version of themodel, each state would have a set of available actions, and themodel would learn
values for state-action pairings rather than learning values just for (after)states.
Furthermore, the afterstate formulationmisses an important way in which analogical transfer is more complex than
similarity-based generalization (SBG), which doesn’t accommodate the translation provided by the analogical mapping.
In the extended forestate version of the presentmodel, generalization is not just via blind similarity, because it takes
themapping (and hence the structure of the stimuli) into account. In a sense, the action is in the schema. A forestate
model wherein structure mapping informed only the similarity computation and not themapping of actions would fail in
cases where the extendedmodel succeeds. Consider the fork example from chess in Figure 1. SBGwould infer that a
capturing action involving the knight in the game on the left would apply to a knight in the game on the right. If instead
the action is in the schema, then a capturing action by the knight on the left would be correctly translated through the
mapping into a capturing action by the analogous queen on the right.
8.3 | Two-StageMemory Retrieval
A challenge for the present model is tractability, because it’s not feasible to compute analogical mapping to all stored
exemplars in memory. For computational efficiency and simplicity, the current implementation in the tic-tac-toe
domain exploits knowledge of the game’s invariance under a predetermined set of simple symmetries. A solution to
the tractability problem for the full model that uses structural mapping is to incorporate two-stagememory retrieval,
following the MAC/FACmodel (Forbus et al., 1995). The first stage uses fast feature-vector similarity to efficiently
retrieve a set of candidate exemplars, and the second stage uses structural alignment to determine the best analogical
matches. Such two-stage retrieval enables a more computationally tractable and psychologically plausible form of
analogical inference from stored exemplars to novel situations.
The first stage of retrieval (Many Are Called) computes aMAC score which is used to select the set of candidate
exemplars that pass on to the second (Few Are Called) stage. The candidate exemplar set is defined by the top N
exemplars sorted by descendingMAC score. To compute each exemplar’s MAC score, first the model computes the
cosine similarity between each exemplar’s feature vector and the candidate state’s feature vector. The choice of cosine
similarity is an implementational detail, and themodel is not theoretically committed to this particular choice of featural
similarity. The present model’s attention-learningmechanism can be incorporated into theMAC score bymultiplying
the featural similarity measure by the exemplar-specific attention weights u to compute each exemplar’sMAC score:
MAC (S , E ) = u(E )p f (S ) · f (E )‖f (S ) ‖ ‖f (E ) ‖ . (8)
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These two components (featural similarity and attention) in the MAC score make exemplars with higher featural
similarity and higher attentions more likely to be retrieved frommemory and included in the set of candidate exemplars.
Thusmore useful exemplars aremore likely to be retrieved and relied upon for generalization. 2 The relative weighting
of the featural similarity and the exemplar attentions is set by an exponent p on the attention weight. The second
stage of retrieval (FewAre Called) computes a FAC score through amore computationally complex structure-mapping
process on relational representations. In the present model, the FAC score is the analogical similarity of Equation 2.
Although themapping and similarity scoring process itself is not currently learned, it may be productive to enable the
prediction error signal to influencemapping or scoring itself, as in Liang and Forbus (2015).
TheMAC/FAC extension also lays groundwork that will be useful for a later model with relational consolidation,
which is discussed in detail in the next section. In brief, the exemplars that are learned to be most useful (via the
attention-learning mechanism described above) would become new perceptual features which could be leveraged
by the MAC retrieval stage to improve the candidate exemplars retrieved for the subsequent structural alignment
processing.
8.4 | Relational Consolidation
Although the present integration of analogy, schema induction, and reinforcement learning proves powerful, there’s
a ceiling to what it can learn because all it can do is build configurations of the primitive elements it’s endowedwith.
It lacks amechanism to create rich compositional hierarchies of relational concepts. Examples of such compositional
hierarchies include computer architecture, mathematical functions, and natural languages, which all exemplify multiple
levels of abstraction by chunking systems of relations at one level into building blocks at the next level. In computer
architecture, digital logic gates are composed to form adders, which are composedwith other digital circuits to form
an arithmetic logic unit (ALU), which is a building block in a computer’s CPU. Software designmanages complexity by
continuing this hierarchy, composing primitive functions intomore complex functions, and from there to objects and
design patterns. The conceptual progression inmathematics proceeds similarly, composing the counting operation to
define adding, which is further composed to formmultiplying, and then exponentiation. In traditional views of linguistics,
phonemes, morphemes, words, and sentences form another example of a relational hierarchy.3
Althoughwe agreewith theories of schema induction, we argue it is insufficient to explain human relational learning.
Schemas are explicit relational structures, and thus they cannot be bound to roles of yet-higher-order relations in the
way unitary objects and relations can. Experiments with chimpanzees suggest that newly learned relations can only
fill roles of other relations if they can be represented as atomic entities (Thompson et al., 1997). Therefore, to explain
acquisition of relational hierarchies, we put forward the hypothesis that useful schemas are eventually replaced (or
supplemented) with unitary representations (Foster et al., 2012). Thus, a concept that was represented as a system of
relations (via the schema) can now be represented as an atomic entity, capable of entering into relations itself. We label
this process relational consolidation, in a deliberate parallel to theories of episodic memory consolidation (e.g., Squire
and Alvarez, 1995).
As summarized in Table 2, consolidation is hypothesized to confer properties to a concept that are not true of
(unconsolidated) schemas, because consolidated concepts are recognizable perceptually, without explicit (working-
memory dependent) structuremapping (Corral and Jones, 2014, 2017; Foster et al., 2012). A consolidated concept can
2In the existingmodel, exemplar attention u is standing in for the expected value of retrieval, whereas in the extendedmodel with two-stage retrieval, retrieval
probability is linearly related to u. Our theoretical commitment is that an exemplar with a higher u has higher probability of being retrieved (monotonic
relationship).
3Relational hierarchies are not taxonomic hierarchies. In a taxonomic hierarchy, each concept or category is a union of lower-level categories. In a relational
hierarchy, each instance of a concept is a configuration of instances of lower-order concepts.
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TABLE 2 Predicted consequences of consolidation.
Not Consolidated Consolidated
More affected byWMdemands Less affected byWMdemands
Quicker at analogical inference, because structure
mapping is active
Easier to learn higher-order structure, because in-
stances can be represented by tokens
Serial retrieval Parallel retrieval
be recognized automatically, retrieved frommemory in parallel, and represented as an element of yet-higher-order
relations.
It is important to note that consolidation is not a change in the declarative knowledge embodied by a concept.
Rather, it is a proceduralization of the concept that enables future changes in knowledge – similar to the interaction
between declarative and procedural knowledge in production systems (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).
The MAC/FAC model discussed above embodies the assumption that verifying the lower-level elements of an
episode (i.e., predefined objects and relations) is fast and automatic, whereas verifying relational structure is slower
and requires working-memory resources (Forbus et al., 1995). From this perspective, relational consolidation enables
higher-order relational structure to be chunked and treated as a dimension of the feature vector used for memory
probing. Prior to consolidation, retrieval of instances of a higher-order relational structure requires something like the
FAC stage, in which agents explicitly map between those instances and the schema. Following consolidation, retrieval
can rely solely on theMAC stage, thus operatingmuchmore rapidly andwithout requiring workingmemory. We also
propose a similar difference for perceptual recognition of instances of the concept. Before consolidation, episodes must
be structurally aligned to a schema. After consolidation, an instance of the concept is explicitly represented and bound
to the lower-order relations.
We further propose that analogy, schema induction, and relational consolidation form a cycle that, when iterated,
can produce relational hierarchies of arbitrary depth (height). This form of learning leads to a dualist view of objects and
relations, in which (nearly) every concept is both a relational structure among its components and an object capable of
participating in relations. The conceptual systems built from this hierarchical relational chunking are potentially quite
powerful and flexible.
8.5 | Conclusions
This paper has proposed a psychological theory that integrates reinforcement learning with relational representations
and analogy. The integration produces a computational synergy in which analogy enables abstract generalization, and
reinforcement learning drives discovery of useful relational concepts without relying on hand-coded representations.
Analogy contributes mechanisms to generalize based on relational similarity, translate rewarding actions between
mapped scenarios via analogical transfer, and produce progressively more abstract representations of the environment
via schema induction. In return, reinforcement learning contributes mechanisms to learn the long-term value of
exemplars, guide schema induction, and learn exemplar-specific attentions based on reward predictiveness. These
mutually supportivemechanisms combine in a way that begins to explain how people andmachines can learn abstract
concepts based on experience with the world.
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